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NCAA-BASED AGENT REGULATION: WHO
ARE WE PROTECTING?
JAN STIGLITZ*
Over the last decade, the popular press has created a new vil-
lain: the sports agent. Wearing gold chains and white shoes, this
villain has allegedly seduced the youth of our nation with suitcases
full of money, or forced our local sports hero into bankruptcy
because a shopping center deal went sour. We are regularly told
that there are many "bad" agents and that "agent abuse" is second
only to drug abuse as a national problem. In response, many states
now attempt to regulate the athlete representation industry.'
There are two areas where the agent can harm an athlete.
The first area involves the actual representation of the athlete. It
encompasses incompetence or dishonesty in contract representa-
tion and in managing an athlete's finances. The typical scenario
here may have an agent self-dealing, making bad investment deci-
sions, or charging fees in a manner that results in the agent receiv-
ing the lion's share of the money actually paid to the athlete.
While I do not believe that current state regulatory schemes can
adequately deal with these problems,2 the states' efforts are cer-
tainly laudable.
* B.A., 1970, SUNY at Buffalo; J.D. (Cum Laude), 1975, Albany Law School; LL.M.,
1980, Harvard Law School; Vice Dean and Professor of Law, California Western School of
Law.
1. Those states regulating the athlete representation industry are: Alabama: ALA.
CODE §§ 8-26-1 to 8-26-41 (Supp. 1990); California: CAL. LAB. CODE §j 1500 to 1547 (West
1989); Florida: FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 468.451 to 468.457 (West Supp. 1991); Georgia: GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 84-8101 to 84-8118 (Supp. 1989); Illinois: ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 38 § 29-1
(Smith-Hurd 1977 & Supp. 1990); Indiana: IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-46-4-1 to 35-46-44 (Bums
Supp. 1990); Iowa: IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 9A.1 to 9A.12 (West 1989 & Supp. 1991); Kentucky:
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 518.080 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990); Louisiana: LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 4:421 to 4:430 (West 1987 & Supp. 1991); Maryland: MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, 632-
40 (Supp. 1990); Michigan: MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.41le (West 1991); Minnesota:
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325E.33 (West Supp. 1991); Mississippi: MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 73-41-1 to
73-41-23 (Supp. 1990); North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 78C-71 to 78C-81 (1990); Ohio:
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4771.01 to 4771.99 (Anderson Supp. 1990); Oklahoma: OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 821.61-821.71 (West 1989); Pennsylvania: PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7107
(Purdon 1989); South Carolina: S.C. CODE ANN. % 59-102-10 to 59-10-250 (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1990); Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 49-7-2101 to 49-7-2104 (1990); Texas: TEX.
REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8871, 1-11 (Vernon Supp. 1991); Virginia: VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 54.1-518 to 54,1-525 (Supp. 1990).
All of these have been adopted within the last decade. For a history of this legislation
see generally Sobel, The Regulation of Sports Agents An Analytical Primer, 39 BAYLOR L.
REV. 701 (1987).
2. An analysis of the deficiencies of state regulation in dealing with incompetence and
dishonesty is beyond the scope of this piece. For a discussion of the ineffectiveness and
inadequacy of state regulation, see Ehrhardt and Rodgers, Tightening the Defense Against
Offensive Sports Agents, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 633 (1988); Rodgers, States Revamp Defense
Against Agents, 4 THE SPORTs LAWYER 1 (Winter 1988-89); Kohn, Sports Agents
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The second area of agent abuse deals with the problems
engendered in the creation of the athlete-agent relationship.
Here the most significant consequence of an agent's action is the
athlete's loss of National Collegiate Athletic Association3 eligibility.
But is this truly a problem for the athlete, or is it merely a problem
for the colleges and the fans of the colleges' athletic teams?
This article will examine the regulatory schemes that are tied
to NCAA eligibility. I will first review the current NCAA rules on
permissible contact between an athlete and an agent. My premise
is that the rules are not needed to protect "amateurism." Instead,
they protect the schools at the expense of the athlete and leave the
athlete at risk. I will then review state agent regulatory schemes
which give these NCAA rules the force of law and bind the athlete
(and the agent) to them. My conclusion is that this system of state-
enforced NCAA regulation is harmful to the athlete and unreason-
ably restricts the athlete and agent from legitimately marketing
the athlete's services. Instead of protecting the athlete, much of
this legislation only serves to protect the colleges and universities.
NCAA ELIGIBILITY RULES
Because the statutes to be examined here are keyed to NCAA
eligibility rules, it is first appropriate to review these rules. How-
ever, the focus will be limited. A complete analysis of the struc-
ture of the NCAA, its power, and whether it governs wisely when
one considers the full spectrum of intercollegiate athletics, is
beyond the scope of this piece. Instead, the focus is on major col-
lege football and basketball programs. These programs generate
an enormous amount of revenue for the schools,4 and also serve as
farm systems for the NBA and the NFL.' In addition, the schools
Representing Professional Athletes, Being Certified Means Never Having to Say You're
Qualified, 6 THE ENT. & SPORTS LAWYER 1 (Winter 1988).
3. The National Collegiate Athletic Association is a voluntary association of
approximately 1,000 members. Virtually all major colleges and universities are members of
the NCAA. National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 183-84
(1988).
4. A few years ago, it was estimated that the 105 Division I football programs would
raise and spend about a billion dollars. George Will, "Our Schools for Scandal,"
NEWSWEEK, Sept. 15, 1986. Recently, the College Football Association, representing
approximately sixty schools, signed a $300 million contract with ABC. Wall St. J., Nov. 14,
1990, at B1.
It would be difficult to accurately estimate what any given program brings in to a
particular school. Television revenue, of course, is a major component. But schools benefit
in other ways that defy easy estimation. For example, a school with a successful athletic
program may find it easier to recruit students and to obtain donations from alumni.




in this group are the places where the agents to be regulated are
actually plying their trade.6
Regardless of how much money is generated by a college
team, the NCAA views these programs as amateur sports. In pur-
suit of its goal of furthering "amateur"7 competition, the NCAA
has adopted numerous rules that define and govern an athlete's
amateur status.8 Generally speaking, these rules prohibit an ath-
lete from earning money by reason of his athletic skill, except for
approved scholarships and expenses. In addition, the rules gener-
ally prohibit an athlete from competing on a professional team
even if the athlete is not paid.' I suspect that many of the athletic
directors and university presidents who wrote and currently sup-
port these rules are not motivated by the need to preserve some
pure notion of "amateurism." Instead, they are concerned with
how much it would cost their institutions if they had to competi-
tively reward athletes for their skills. But even if these rules serve
some higher purpose, the athletes who are restricted by them
receive disfavored treatment when compared with students who
do not participate in athletics.
For example, when I went to college, I participated in my
school's music programs, performing in a variety of school spon-
sored music groups. One group even entered an intercollegiate
competition where significant cash prizes were awarded. Yet
there were no rules that prohibited me from using my musical
ability to earn money on weekends and in the summer. Similarly,
students who are given academic scholarships are not precluded
from using their intelligence or education to supplement their
scholarships and make their lives easier. If IBM wants to wine and
dine a budding business major and hire her for the summer at an
exorbitant salary, so as to improve its chances of recruiting that
student for a permanent job after graduation, no one complains or
6. Nor do I purport to do a neutral analysis. I freely admit (and hope to demonstrate)
that the current system of NCAA-ruled college athletics is exploitive and hypocritical. It is
a system that allows athletes to enter with credentials that suggest an inability to do
satisfactory high school work. As a result, many schools have appallingly low graduation
rates.
7. According to its constitution, a "basic purpose" of the NCAA is to "maintain
intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educationl program and the athlete as an
integral part of the student body and, by so doing, retain a clear line of demarcation
between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports." NCAA CONST. art. 1, § 1.3.1.
National Collegiate Athletic Association Manual 1991-92, at 1 [hereinafter referred to as
NCAA MANUAL].
8. See generally BYLAw art. 12.1, NCAA MANUAL at 67 (general regulations).
9. Id. One exception involves golf and tennis, where mixed competition is allowed. Id.
§ 12.2.3.2, NCAA MANUAL at 70.
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threatens her with the loss of her academic scholarship. Yet col-
lege athletes have these restrictions.
Even if one accepts the basic premise of amateurism and the
need to regulate so as to keep the competition even, the rules go a
few steps farther and severely restrict the extent to which an ath-
lete can receive advice and plan for his future professional career.
For example, one critical choice that an athlete must make is
which college to attend. A highly talented high school athlete may
be pursued by many schools. An athlete who may not have
received much attention while in high school may want to market
himself to colleges. Yet both are restricted in their ability to con-
tract with an agent to assist in the process. 10 In theory, the athlete
can get advice from his high school coach or members of his fam-
ily. But there is no reason to assume that they have the expertise
needed. Nor is there any reason why retaining an expert should
be prohibited.
The need for advice and career counseling can be just as
important to an athlete while he is in college. But NCAA rules
clearly prohibit an athlete from entering into a contract with an
agent for the future marketing of his services without immediately
losing his amateur status." The athlete loses his eligibility even if
his representation agreement with an agent provides for represen-
tational services (such as negotiation with a professional team) to
begin after he12 has completed his college eligibility. 13 The rules
do allow the schools to form a "career counseling panel" to assist
the athlete.' 4 But the members of the panel must be employees of
the school,' 5 so neutrality cannot be expected.
The athlete is also restricted in his ability to receive legal
advice. He can only receive legal advice from an attorney, regard-
ing a contract, if that attorney has not or is not going to represent
him with regard to that contract.' 6 Thus, the NCAA rules do not
necessarily protect the athlete. Instead, they hamper his ability to
get advice and protect himself. As a result, state enforcement can-
not be justified by a need to protect the athlete.
Before reviewing state regulation, two more points need to be
10. Id. §§ 12.3.1 and 12.3.3, NCAA MANUAL at 71-72.
11. Id. § 12.1.1(f), NCAA MANUAL at 68.
12. With all due respect to the many fine female athletes competing at the college
level, the problems dealt with here primarily arise in men's football and basketball.
13. BYLAw § 12.3.1, NCAA MANUAL at 72.
14. Id. § 12.3.4, NCAA MANUAL at 72.
15. Id. § 12.3.4.2, NCAA MANUAL at 72.
16. Id. § 12.3.2, NCAA MANUAL at 72.
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made. First, neither the athlete nor the agent has the ability to
promulgate, change or interpret NCAA rules.17 Second, the
NCAA is not currently viewed as a state actor.' 8 As a result, pro-
viding for state enforcement further binds an athlete to a system
that he can neither reform nor fight.
NCAA-BASED AGENT REGULATION
Of the twenty-one states that currently regulate agents, all but
California have provisions that are in some way tied to NCAA rules
on eligibility. Some of these are similar to ordinary consumer pro-
tection statutes and can easily be justified. For example, several
states require that the contract between the athlete and the agent
contain a written notice warning an athlete that he will lose his
eligibility if he signs with the agent.1 9 Other state statutes regu-
late fees.20
Similarly, some state statutes provide for a cooling off period,
which allows the athlete to rescind the contract.21 Although this
will enable the athlete to get out of the contract, it might not pre-
vent an athlete from losing his eligibility. According to NCAA
rules, amateur status is lost when an athlete enters into an agree-
ment with an agent.2
Under other state statutes, an agreement entered into
17. Under its constitution, membership in the NCAA is available to: "colleges,
universities, athletic conferences or associations and other groups that are related to
intercollegiate athletics .... " NCAA CONST. art. 3, § 3.1.1, NCAA MANUAL at 8. All
governing legislation is adopted by the membership. NCAA CoNsT. art. 5, § 5.01.1, NCAA
MANUAL, at 27.
18. National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 199 (1988).
19. For example, South Carolina requires that the following notice be printed in at
least 10-point type that is bold faced, capitalized, underlined, or otherwise set out from
surrounding written material so as to be conspicuous:
WARNING: IF YOU AS A STUDENT ATHLETE SIGN THIS CONTRACT,
YOU MAY LOSE YOUR ELIGIBILITY TO COMPETE IN
INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS. PURSUANT TO SOUTH CAROLINA
LAW, YOU SHALL NOTIFY THE ATHLETIC DIRECTOR OR PRESIDENT
OF YOUR COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY AND THE ADMINISTRATOR OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS IN WRITING BEFORE
PRACTICING FOR OR PARTICIPATING IN AN ATHLETIC EVENT ON
BEHALF OF A COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY OR WITHIN SEVENTY-TWO
HOURS AFTER ENTERING INTO THIS CONTRACT, WHICHEVER
OCCURS FIRST. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS NOTICE IS A CRIMINAL
OFFENSE.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-102-30(D) (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1990).
20. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70 § 821.63 (West 1989).
21. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 56 § 635(d) (Supp. 1990) (Maryland gives an athlete
the right to cancel a contract within 15 days after the date it is signed); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 49-7-2108 (1990) (Tennessee gives an athlete 20 days); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78C-75(d) (1990);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-102-30(G) (Law. Co-op Supp. 1990); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-520E
(Supp. 1990).
22. BYLAw § 12.1.1(f), NCAA MANUAL at 68.
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between an athlete and an agent which violates the statutory
scheme is void.23 This might actually protect the athlete's eligibil-
ity. If the agreement is truly void, as opposed to merely voidable,
the athlete could argue that it never existed and that he never
violated the NCAA's eligibility rule.
Some state schemes go one step farther and provide for notifi-
cation of the potential contract to the athlete's school.24 South
Carolina has passed a statute that requires both the agent and the
athlete to notify the school and makes the failure to notify a crimi-
nal offense.25 These provisions are also legitimate to the extent
that notice allows the school to avoid being charged with an NCAA
violation or prevents the athlete from continuing to accept schol-
arship aid that may no longer be owed.
Some state statutory schemes are designed to give notice to
the university prior to the athlete's signing, so that the schools are
given a chance to convince the athlete to change his mind before
the athlete has irrevocably lost his eligibility.26 Again, these stat-
utes provide a measure of protection for the athlete by giving him
a chance to think through his decision and get additional informa-
tion from his school before making a very important decision. The
school has a certain investment in an athlete and thus a legitimate
interest in keeping that athlete in their program. If the school is
notified in advance, the athlete will get to hear all of the argu-
ments against signing the contract. This should enable him to
make a more informed decision.
But a number of states have gone far beyond athlete protec-
tion. Ten states currently prohibit agents from signing agree-
ments with college athletes prior to completion of their NCAA
eligibility. These state prohibitions are unconscionable and only
23. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4771.04 (Supp. 1989); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 8871 § 8(c) (Vernon Supp. 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. 78C-78(b) (1990); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 59-102-30(E) (Law. Co-op Supp. 1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-522B (Supp. 1990).
24. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 468.454(2) (West Supp. 1991); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-
4-4 (West 1990); TENN CODE ANN. § 49-7-2104 (1990); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8871
§ 5(c) (Vernon Supp. 1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-520E (Supp. 1990).
25. S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-102-30(A) and (B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990). But if the agent
is an attorney, do we have a mandated breach of the normal attorney-client privilege?
26. Minnesota requires a written waiver of eligibility form to be filed with the
secretary of state and sent to the school's athletic director, and provides that a contract may
not be entered into prior to the filing of this waiver. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 325E.33(2) and
(3) (West Supp. 1990). Similarly, Georgia's scheme requires notification and a thirty day
waiting period prior to signing the athlete. GA. CODE ANN. § 84-8116 (Supp. 1989). Ohio
requires a fourteen-day waiting period. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4771.02(B) (Anderson
Supp. 1990).
27. IOWA CODE ANN. § 9A.8 (West 1989); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 518.080
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4 § 4:424(8) (West 1990); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 56, § 636(bX5) (Supp. 1990); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.411(e) (1991); Miss.
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serve to protect the colleges at the expense of the athletes.
If these prohibitions are based on the premise that it is always
in an athlete's best interest to complete his eligibility prior to
entering the pro draft, they are very misguided. There are a
number of reasons why an athlete would be well-advised to start a
professional career prior to completing his years of NCAA
eligibility.
There is a risk that an athlete will suffer a career-ending injury
prior to the completion of his eligibility. For example, a third year
running back who wins a HeismanTrophy and cannot legitimately
afford to get an insurance policy to protect his professional earning
potential should seriously consider a decision to enter the draft
after his junior year. Since the NCAA rules prevent an athlete
from accepting such a policy without losing his eligibility,2 only
the athlete with independent financial resources can get protec-
tion. In this situation, a statute that prohibits an athlete from turn-
ing pro early works a severe hardship.
The vagaries of the professional draft systems may also lead to
a need for an athlete to turn pro prior to completion of college
eligibility. Under the current draft and reserve systems in profes-
sional football, basketball and baseball, an athlete who is drafted is
bound to a particular club for a certain amount of time and cannot
freely market his services. An athlete who has a preference as to
which pro team he would like to play for (or an aversion to playing
for one or more pro teams) may want to enter the draft in a year
when he is in a better position to be drafted by a preferred team,
or to avoid being drafted by a disfavored team. Why should the
state, under the guise of athlete protection, prevent a player from
using what little flexibility he has to avoid an oppressive (and per-
haps illegal) draft system?
The abundance or lack of players in his skill category may also
play a role in deciding when it is preferable for an athlete to enter
the draft. For example, a center in basketball may have a higher
market value in a year in which there are no other top centers
available. Here, again, it may be in the athlete's best interest not
to complete his college eligibility.
Another reason for turning pro sooner relates to whether the
CODE ANN. § 73-41-11(g) (1989); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 821.64.8 (West 1989); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7107(AX1O) (Purdon 1989); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8871,
§ 6(bX5) (Vernon Supp. 1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 54-1-521(8) (Supp. 1990).
28. An athlete must pay for such a policy himself or borrow the money. BYLAW art.
12.1.2.1, NCAA MANUAL at 69.
1991]
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athlete's school is in good standing with the NCAA. As a penalty
for recruiting violations, the NCAA may prohibit a school from
competing in post-season play. 9 If an athlete is not going to be
able to compete in a post-season tournament in his last year
because of his school's violation of NCAA rules, he should be
allowed to turn pro a year earlier.3 °
These restrictions cannot be justified in terms of ensuring that
athletes get an education, since the statutes are not keyed to grad-
uation and do nothing to address the appallingly low graduation
rates in big time football and basketball programs.31 Many people
drop out of college and return later on. An athlete who earns a
substantial amount of money as a professional can easily afford to
return to school for an education. Similarly, the statutes cannot be
justified by a need to protect underage athletes. First, they are not
written in terms of an athlete's age. Second, most athletes who are
being recruited are of the age of majority and do not need special
protection. Moreover, athletes are often "redshirted ' 3 2 and kept
in college -for an extended period of time.
The antisigning provisions perpetuate a de facto and, perhaps,
de jure system of involuntary servitude. A high school athlete who
wants to be a professional basketball or football player must go to
college to learn his trade. While there, the NCAA prevents him
from earning money based on his athletic ability. The athlete is
then turned over to professional leagues only after the colleges
have received their four years' worth of services at very little cost.
As a pro, the athlete is again restricted in his ability to freely mar-
ket his services by reason of the draft and reserve systems.
Some states go beyond antisigning provisions and actually pre-
vent the agent from speaking with an athlete. These statutes
make it difficult for an athlete to make an intelligent choice. For
example, Oklahoma makes it illegal for an agent to contact an ath-
lete and discuss representation prior to the completion of NCAA
eligibility.33 Oklahoma does allow an agent to talk to an athlete at
a college-sponsored information forum.34 But this is not going to
29. Id. §§ 19.4.2.1(d) and (e), NCAA MANUAL at 334.
30. This is the situation that members of UNLV's basketball team faced last year. Many
were surprised that Stacey Augnon did not enter the NBA draft as a junior.
31. According to a recent article, the graduation rates for Black athletes were 26.1% in
football and 17.1% in basketball. Harvey, Book Review, L.A. Times, Dec. 30, 1990, at 1.
32. Redshirting is a practice that allows a college to stockpile an athlete who is not
currently needed. An athlete who is redshirted is kept from traveling and playing for the
team in competition although he is allowed to practice.
33. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 821.64(8) (West Supp. 1990). See also N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 78C-77 (1990) (requiring prior written notice before communication).
34. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 821.65 (West Supp. 1990).
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benefit an athlete who may need advice in his third year, because
the forum must take place in the athlete's senior year.
The athlete is left with no legitimate means to acquire the cru-
cial information he needs in order to make an intelligent career
decision. One cannot assume that a coach or athletic director is
going to give an athlete good advice. They have a vested financial
interest in the athlete's continuing to compete at the college level.
Even if they were able to be objective, they may not know the
marketplace as well as experienced agents.
Another questionable provision found in these state statutes is
a restriction on giving anything of value to an athlete. For exam-
ple, Florida prohibits an agent from "offer[ing] anything of value
to induce a student athlete to enter into an agreement by which
the agent will represent the student athlete.""a At first blush, this
seems a proper way to prevent bribery. But the situation here
does not really involve bribery, because it is not dealing with a
public official or an attempt to corrupt our judicial system or any
governmental process.36
Instead, the statute arbitrarily prohibits a transaction that is
reasonable, and in most contexts, generally accepted--an invest-
ment. The athlete has a skill that may be worth money in the
future. The agent, as an investor, is willing to take some risk and
advance money. One can understand why the NCAA may say that
an amateur athlete cannot accept money and remain an amateur,
but why should this transaction be illegal?
Suppose, for example, that a college student on an academic
scholarship has an idea for a better mousetrap but lacks the funds
to patent, build, and successfully market that trap. It would not be
illegal for an investor to advance money against future profits or to
buy a share of the enterprise. Why can't an agent make the same
investment decision with an athlete on an athletic scholarship? In
fact, this kind of arrangement is common in professional golf. The
average amateur golfer who wants to break into the pro tour usu-
ally cannot afford the money to compete while he attempts to win.
In order to play, he will find a sponsor who will advance expenses
against a share of the golfer's earnings.
As indicated, an athlete may be violating an NCAA eligibility
35. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 46R456(4) (West Supp. 1991). See also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38
§ 29-1(b) and (c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990); MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 636(b) (Supp. 1990);
MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 750.411(e) (West 1991); TEx. REv. Cirv. STAT. ANN. art. 8871,
§ 6(bX4) (Vernon Supp. 1990) (for similiar examples of statutes prohibiting bribes).
36. See generally ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 art. 29 "Bribery in Contests" (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1990) (Illinois does, however, categorize this transaction as a bribe).
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rule when he takes money from an agent. The athlete may also be
breaching a contract with the school. But the NCAA and the
school should be able to protect themselves. The state should not
criminalize conduct that is neither immoral nor harmful to the
athlete under the guise of protecting the athlete.
Yet that is exactly what these statutes do. Most states provide
criminal penalties for violations of their regulatory schemes.37 In
some cases, the language is sweeping and raises some concerns as
to how it will be interpreted and enforced. For example, under
Iowa's statute, a person shall not:
Engage in conduct which violates, or causes or contrib-
utes to causing a student or institution of higher educa-
tion to violate, any rule or regulation adopted by the
national collegiate athletic association governing student
athletes and their relationship with athlete agents and
institutions of higher education. 8
The NCAA rules referred to here only relate to amateur sta-
tus. Is such a rule "violated" when an athlete wants to relinquish
amateur status? If an agent is charged, will he be bound by any
findings or conclusions of the NCAA in its own investigation, or
does that question get litigated in the criminal action? Has the
state unlawfully delegated its legislative powers by criminalizing
conduct based on the rules (and findings?) of a private association?
Is the NCAA a state actor in Iowa, since it legislates for that state in
this area?
39
In addition, many states provide for civil penalties or damages
for actions taken in violation of the statutes and rules. For exam-
ple, Georgia's statute provides for a forfeiture of a $100,000 bond
to the athlete's school if the agent fails to provide notification
37. ALA. CODE § 8-26-41 (Supp. 1990) (Class C felony); FLA. STAT. § 468.454(3) (1990)
(felony of the third degree); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 § 29-1(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp.1990) (Class
A misdemeanor); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-4-4 (West 1990) (Class D felony); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 9A.11 (West 1990) ("serious misdemeanor"); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 518.080
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990) (Class D felony); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4:426 (West 1990)
(misdemeanor); MD. ANN. CODE art 56, § 639 (Supp. 1990) (misdemeanor); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 750.41 le (West 1990) (misdemeanor); Miss. CODE ANN. § 73-41-15 (Supp.
1990) (undesignated, but penalty can be up to two years imprisonment); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 70, § 821.66 (West 1989) (undesignated but penalty can be one year imprisonment); 18
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7107 (Purdon 1989) (misdemeanor of the first degree); TEX. REV.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8871, § 8(c) (Vernon Supp. 1991) (Class A misdemeanor).
38. IOWA CODE § 9A.8.2 (West 1990).
39. In Tarkanian, the Supreme Court rejected an analogy to Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961), because the NCAA and UNLV were antagonists and
not joint participants. National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179,




thirty days prior to signing the athlete.4 ° This forfeiture is not
dependent on the athlete's losing college eligibility.
Florida's statute holds the student or agent liable in damages
that result to the college from an athlete's subsequent ineligibility
if the student or agent fails to notify the athletic director that the
student has entered into a contract. 41 The school is also entitled to
damages equal to three times the amount of scholarship awarded
to the athlete.42
One could argue that allowing a university to recover scholar-
ship costs is reasonable. The university that loses an athlete loses
the benefit of its bargain. But awarding three times the amount
seems extreme.
Mississippi also has a provision under which the school can
recover the amount it incurred in providing the athlete with a
scholarship from either the agent or the athlete.43 But it goes one
step farther and allows the university to recover "loss of revenue
and other damages suffered by the institution as a direct result of
such athlete's loss of eligibility. ' 44 The word "direct" may limit
the potential here, but consider the situation where a school loses a
bowl bid because a star became ineligible just before a critical
game. Should the athlete or agent be liable for the million dollar
bowl fee? If a school has a cause of action against an athlete who
doesn't play, shouldn't the athlete have a cause of action if he is
benched?
Tennessee's statute is the broadest and provides for damages
to include "lost television revenues, lost ticket sales of regular sea-
son athletic events, and lost revenues from not qualifying for post
season athletic events such as football bowl games and tourna-
ments."'45 And, in a classic case of overkill, the statute also pro-
vides an additional amount equal to three times the value of the
athlete's scholarship.46
Whatever merit there may be in compensating a university
for losses sustained as a result of losing a star athlete, these statutes
40. GA. CODE ANN. § 43-4A-17 (1990).
41. FLA. STAT. § 468.454(6) (1990). Georgia requires that agents post a bond, which is
then payable to any athletic association that "is aggrieved by any act" of the agent which
violates the statute. GA. CODE ANN. § 43-4A-13 (1990).
42. FLA. STAT. § 468.454(6) (1991).
43. MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-41-23 (1972).
44. Id.
45. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-7-2106 (1990).
46. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-7-2107 (1990). See also TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE
§§ 131.005(b) & (c) (Vernon Supp. 1990) (providing for a cause of action in favor of the
school and the Southwest Athletic Conference for damages suffered due to NCAA sanctions
brought on by a rules violation. Damages may include lost television and ticket sales).
1991] 225
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
cannot be justified by an alleged need to protect the athlete.
Instead, their in terrorem effect is to prevent the athlete from
receiving valuable advice on how best to pursue his career or to
prevent him from pursuing that career until after he has com-
pleted his NCAA servitude.
CONCLUSION
While I have been critical of NCAA-based regulations, I would
not suggest massive deregulation of the industry. There are dis-
honest and incompetent agents who prey on young naive athletes,
costing them an enormous amount of money. But we should be
sure that the regulation focuses on those problems. Regulations
that merely help the major colleges maintain lucrative sports pro-
grams and allow the professional leagues to continue to have a free
farm system do nothing to deal with incompetence and dishon-
esty. Instead, these rules prevent athletes from getting informa-
tion, from getting fair compensation for their services, and from
protecting their future careers.
For reasons that have been discussed, I believe that many of
the central features of states' NCAA-based agent regulations are
neither necessary nor wise. What starts out as paternalistic legisla-
tion designed to protect the athlete may ultimately be another tie
that binds the athlete into an exploitive peonage system which
makes it difficult for the athlete to adequately protect or benefit
from his one precious resource-athletic ability.
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